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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis summarizes research to investigate the characteristics that define 
information automation systems used on aircraft flight decks and the significant impacts that 
these characteristics have on pilot performance. Major accomplishments of the work include 
the development of a set of characteristics that describe information automation systems on 
the flight deck and an experiment designed to study a subset of these characteristics. 
Information automation systems on the flight deck are responsible for the collection, 
processing, analysis, and presentation of data to the flightcrew. These systems pose human 
factors issues and challenges that must be considered by designers of these systems. 
Based on a previously developed formal definition of information automation for 
aircraft flight deck systems, an analysis process was developed and conducted to reach a 
refined set of information automation characteristics. In this work, characteristics are defined 
as a set of properties or attributes that describe an information automation system’s operation 
or behavior, which can be used to identify and assess potential human factors issues. 
Hypotheses were formed for a subset of the characteristics: Automation Visibility, 
Information Quality, and Display Complexity. An experimental investigation was developed 
to measure performance impacts related to these characteristics, which showed mixed results 
of expected and surprising findings, with many interactions. A set of recommendations were 
then developed based on the experimental observations. 
Ensuring that the right information is presented to pilots at the right time and in the 
appropriate manner is the job of flight deck system designers. This work provides a 
foundation for developing recommendations and guidelines specific to information 
automation on the flight deck with the goal of improving the design and evaluation of 
information automation systems before they are implemented.
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
In order to safely and efficiently accommodate an increasing demand for air travel, 
the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) will utilize satellite-based 
navigation and interconnected database systems to guide and track air traffic more precisely 
than was previously feasible (FAA, 2013a). This system will integrate weather, traffic, 
terrain, and aircraft performance data to enhance safety while reducing delays, fuel 
requirements, and aircraft emissions. This transformation will result in increasing automation 
to take advantage of the likely increase in the amount of available information (Landry, 
2009). Conveying the right information at the right time to the flightcrew and accepting input 
from them in a user-friendly manner is critical for safe operations. 
Information automation systems collect, process, analyze, and present information to 
the flightcrew to support their task performance, decision making, and position awareness. 
Glass cockpit displays currently in use in many commercial air transport aircraft are 
examples of information automation systems. Their flexibility allows for any of the available 
information to be processed, analyzed, and presented to the flight crew whenever and 
however interface designers deem it appropriate. The primary goals of information 
automation systems are to promote situation awareness and assist in decision making tasks 
for the flightcrew; they are not intended to directly control the aircraft or its subsystems. 
Situation awareness and decision making assistance are specifically related to human 
information processing and cognition, while direct control of the aircraft and its subsystems 
is more heavily dependent on psychomotor skills and strategic mission planning. As such, 
there are likely unique human factors issues that must be considered when designing the 
interaction behavior of information automation systems. 
This work was funded by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Human Factors 
Division (ANG-C1) (contract #13-G-003). It was a conducted in close collaboration with the 
Human Centered Systems group at Honeywell Aerospace Advanced Technology in 
Minneapolis, MN, though under separate contract. 
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1.1 Problem Statement 
Glass cockpit displays are very sophisticated information automation systems. As 
manufacturers develop these devices and their applications to incorporate and accommodate 
the NextGen directives, they must consider the implications of human factors issues in the 
design of the interactions and the presentation of information. While there is extensive 
literature on human factors issues related to aircraft automation in general, there is typically 
no distinction made regarding different types of automation (e.g., Tenney, Rogers, & Pew, 
1998; Funk, Lyall, Wilson, Vint, Niemczyk, Suroteguh, & Owen, 1999), although there may 
be different human factors issues depending on the type of automation being considered. For 
example, Fadden (1990) and Billings (1991) introduced the concepts of control automation, 
management automation, and information automation. The PARC/CAST Flight Deck 
Automation Working Group has recommended that a stronger definition of information 
automation is needed, as well as definitions of terms related to it (FAA, 2013b). To address 
these recommendations, a more precise definition and characterization of information 
automation systems is needed in order to distinguish them from control and management 
automation systems. 
Additionally, a thorough understanding of the human factors issues associated with 
the characteristics of information automation systems is also needed in order to enhance 
human performance and pilot interactions with these systems. This understanding will help 
prioritize those characteristics that have the greatest impact on pilot performance and will 
help guide the design decisions regarding what, when, and how data is presented. Given that 
tasks and priorities change throughout a mission, the impacts of the characteristics are also 
likely to change, depending on the context and situation the flightcrew is experiencing. For 
example, during approach, impacts such as workload and time pressure are much more 
important than when in cruise. An all-encompassing set of characteristics and a framework 
within which the characteristics can be described will help designers of information 
automation systems appropriately accommodate the human factors impacts associated with 
these changing environments. 
Identification of the characteristics that describe information automation systems will 
help guide the metrics that can be used by design teams to work toward tangible, well-
defined system specifications. 
3 
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The objectives of the work performed were to: 
1) Generate a set of characteristics that describes flight deck information 
automation systems; 
2) Generate and test hypotheses about the human factors impacts of a subset of 
key characteristics; and 
3) Formulate design recommendations for information automation systems. 
 
The focus of this work is in the domain of commercial transport flight decks, but in 
developing the hypotheses for evaluating the human factors impacts of information 
automation systems, previous work in other domains was also explored for broader 
perspective. The amount of information available to pilots is increasing and the importance 
of each piece of information can vary over the course of a flight, making information 
automation in this domain a particularly challenging area of research. 
1.3 Thesis Organization 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: this chapter introduces the motivation for the 
research, the problem statement, and the objectives of the research. Chapter 2 provides the 
relevant background information regarding automation and its human factors impacts, the 
types of automation encountered in the aviation domain, and a formal definition and 
framework for information automation in the aviation domain. 
Chapter 3 presents the process followed in defining the characteristics of information 
automation in the aviation domain. It begins with a brief description of the initial, heuristic 
means to define the characteristics of information automation systems. Next, an analytical 
method to refine the characteristics is described. The chapter closes with the final proposed 
set of information automation system characteristics in the domain of commercial transport 
flight decks. 
Chapter 4 focuses on three particularly important characteristics identified in the 
previous chapter: information quality, automation visibility, and display complexity. As each 
of these characteristics occupy their own areas of research, this chapter provides background 
information on each of these topics to describe how these characteristics are assessed in other 
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domains. The adaptation of these characteristics to the domain of interest in this research is 
also briefly introduced. 
In Chapter 5, a description of the experimental method used to evaluate the three 
characteristics of interest is presented. Participants were given a decision making task, using 
an automated aid developed specifically for this research. Details are provided regarding the 
decision aid, the testing environment, the manipulation of the independent variables, and the 
measurement of the dependent variables. 
Chapter 6 presents the results of the experiments and preliminary interpretations. 
Next, Chapter 7 provides a discussion of the results. The human factors issues 
impacted by each of the characteristics tested are discussed at length and recommendations 
for design based on the experimental results are provided. 
Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the research and recommends future work. 
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CHAPTER 2   
RELATED WORK 
This chapter presents an overview of earlier work to describe automation systems in 
general and the potential human factors issues that can result from implementing such 
systems. Next, previous work to describe the various categories of automation specific to the 
aviation domain are discussed, leading to a formal definition of information automation on 
the flight deck as well as a framework to define flight deck information automation. 
2.1 Automation 
Automation has been defined as “…a device or system that accomplishes (partially or 
fully) a function that was previously, or conceivably could be, carried out (partially or fully) 
by a human operator” (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000, p. 287). Increasing 
computational capability and continuing technological innovations has led to sophisticated 
automation systems across many complex domains such as aviation, medicine, nuclear 
power, and manufacturing, just to name a few. Some of the obvious benefits of automation 
are increased reliability, efficiency, and throughput capability, while at the same time 
reducing both the physical and mental workload for their human operators. 
There have been, however, some unanticipated consequences because of automation 
that have led to catastrophic events when the interactions between the human and the 
machine do not go as planned, or when the automation fails and the human operator is unable 
to intervene and recover from the failure. Two relatively recent aviation-related examples of 
such events are the Asiana Airlines flight 214 and Air France flight 447 accidents. A 
significant contributing factor in the Asiana 214 accident was confusion by the flightcrew 
regarding the autothrottle system during the approach to landing – “the flightcrew believed 
the autothrottle system would maintain the command speed” when, in fact, the autothrottle 
had been inadvertently deactivated by earlier actions by the pilot (Asiana Airlines, 2014, p. 
32). In the Air France flight 447 accident, the airplane encountered high altitude ice crystals 
upon entering a line of thunderstorms at cruise altitude, resulting in blockage of all three pitot 
tubes and subsequent loss of airspeed measurement. The loss of airspeed measurement 
resulted in the autopilot disconnecting and the flight controls reverting from “normal law” to 
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“alternate law”. Due to the unlikely event of either of these conditions, let alone both at once, 
the pilots had no experience with the handling qualities of the airplane under these 
circumstances (et d’Analyses, 2009; Palmer, 2013). These tragic events highlight the need 
for better understanding and accommodation of the human operator within complex systems. 
An initial consideration in the design of automation systems is in the allocation of 
duties between humans and machines. Early work in this area includes the Fitts’ list, also 
known by the acronym MABA-MABA (“Men are better at, Machines are better at”), which 
consists of six statements that point out those areas where humans perform better than 
machines and five statements indicating tasks that machines perform better than humans 
(Fitts, 1951). While this list is based on the technology available at the time, it continues to 
be cited today and has been argued as still being relevant to automation design (de Winter & 
Dodou, 2011). 
Function allocation and Fitts’ list then led to the concept of Levels of Automation, 
suggested by Sheridan and Verplank (1978) and later formalized by Sheridan (1980) and 
Wickens, Mavor, and McGee (1997). At the low extreme (level 1) of the ten-point Level of 
Automation scale, the human performs all tasks continuously with no computer assistance. 
At the other extreme (level 10), the computer makes all decisions and carries out the 
execution of those decisions with no human input. Between the extremes are different 
degrees of participation in a particular task by the human and the automation. Table 1 shows 
the Level of Automation scale as presented by Wickens, Mavor, Parasuraman, and McGee 
(1998). 
Table 1. Scale of Levels of Automation of decision and control action (Wickens et al., 1998). 
HIGH 10. The computer decides everything and acts autonomously, ignoring the human. 
 9. informs the human only if it, the computer, decides to 
 8. informs the human only if asked, or 
 7. executes automatically, then necessarily informs the human, and 
 6. allows the human a restricted time to veto before automatic execution, or 
 5. executes that suggestion if the human approves, or 
 4. suggests one alternative, and 
 3. narrows the selection down to a few, or 
 2. The computer offers a complete set of decision/action alternatives, or 
LOW 1. The computer offers no assistance: the human must take all decisions and actions. 
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Parasuraman et al. (2000) refined the Level of Automation scale to include a second 
dimension to represent specific information processing stages: 
1) Information acquisition; 
2) Information analysis; 
3) Decision and action selection; and 
4) Action implementation. 
In this model, levels of automation between the human and the system can be 
individually assigned at each of these four stages. Parasuraman et al. (2000) succinctly refer 
to these stages of automation as acquisition, analysis, decision, and action automation. 
Furthermore, the first two stages of acquisition and analysis automation are jointly referred to 
as information automation by the authors. The primary objective of information automation 
systems in this context is to augment the operator’s perception and cognition. 
Examples of information acquisition automation include mechanically manipulating 
sensors, organizing incoming information, prioritizing information, or filtering incoming 
information based on some criterion (Parasaurman et al., 2000). Examples of information 
analysis automation include (Bass & Pritchett, 2008): converting raw sensor data into an 
easier-to-understand form; comparing current sensor data to stored data or modeled 
predictions to assess performance or detect abnormal conditions; detect, predict, or highlight 
trends, patterns or conditions; or aggregating multiple information sources into a unified 
assessment. 
Parasuraman et al. (2000) go on to define decision automation as consisting of 
various levels of assistance provided to the operator for making decisions. An example of 
decision automation include systems that have preprogrammed conditional logic rules built 
in that prescribe specific decision choices based on the existence of a particular set of 
conditions. Finally, an example of action automation is a system that would carry out or 
execute a selected response. These systems would typically replace the operator’s hand or 
voice in the actual implementation of a decision. 
2.2 Human Factors Impacts of Automation 
Billings (1991) and Norman (1993) argued that the design of automation systems 
should be centered on the human operator, rather than pushing the human operator to the 
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periphery and forcing them to adapt to the automation. Wickens (1994) pointed out that a 
potential result of poor automation implementation is human operators being “out-of-the-
loop” with what the system is doing, which compromises situation awareness, increases 
complacency, and may lead to degradation of domain-relevant cognitive reasoning skills. 
Therefore, automation strategies must be carefully designed for the operator, with the goal of 
keeping operators appropriately engaged in their tasks and goals. 
While this philosophy has been widely agreed upon, its implementation has 
progressed rather slowly. Sheridan (2001) points to the difficulty of creating predictive 
models of human behavior over those of physical systems as a cause for this slow 
progression. Additionally, economic factors and rapidly emerging technology have continued 
to be the driving forces behind automation systems, resulting in a shift of human roles and 
responsibilities to essentially that of monitor, error handler, and automation manager (Sarter 
& Woods, 1997; Kaber, Wright, Prinzel, & Clamann, 2005), roles for which it is known that 
humans are not well suited (Wiener & Curry, 1980; Parasuraman, 1987). In these new roles, 
if an operator is not informed of what the system is doing or such indications are missed, then 
the operator may be surprised and perceive the system as behaving illogically. “Automation 
surprises” (Sarter, Woods, & Billings, 1997) occur when the system fails to take an expected 
action, or the automation carries out an action not explicitly commanded nor expected by the 
operator. This can lead to operators wondering what the system is doing and why, or what it 
will do next (Wiener, 1989). 
From the performance aspect, the end result of automation surprise is typically 
delayed response or completely missing the opportunity to provide corrective action. Sarter 
and Woods (2000) conducted an experimental study with Airbus A-320 pilots in a full-flight 
simulator and demonstrated that pilots had more frequent instances of delayed interventions 
and errors of omission when interacting with systems with higher levels of autonomy and 
authority. In their summary, the authors point out that the difference between responses being 
delayed vs. completely missed was primarily dependent on whether effective feedback was 
provided. The authors also note that mode awareness problems can be addressed by making 
automated systems more observable. In particular, when the automation carries out an 
uncommanded action or transition, the system should actively alert the pilot to the situation. 
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The design of automated decision aids should include considerations regarding how 
much information is made available to the operator about the rationale, criteria, uncertainty, 
and determining factors used in forming the aid’s judgments and its actions (Bass & 
Pritchett, 2008). The uncertainty considered by the automation, and how that uncertainty is 
communicated to the human, also impact operator decision making (Andre & Cutler, 1998) 
and performance (Bisantz, Marsiglio, & Munch, 2005). In addition, the human-automation 
interaction is complicated by a feedback loop between the automation’s judgments and the 
human's information seeking, cue utilization, and judgment policy (Bass & Pritchett, 2008). 
If the algorithms used by the automation are highly complex and are dissimilar from the 
human’s strategies or not understood by the human, the automation’s outputs may be ignored 
(Adelman, Christian, Gualtieri, & Johnson, 1998; Kirlik, 1993). On the other hand, overly 
simplistic strategies may be disregarded as nuisances (Seagull & Sanderson, 2001). The type 
and level of information about automation reasoning and behavior has a strong effect on the 
human’s trust, and may result in under or over-reliance on automation (Lee & See, 2004; 
Seong & Bisantz, 2002). 
The type of automation may also lead to differing impacts in terms of human 
adaptability in using information automation. For instance, Kaber et al. (2005) found that for 
adaptive automation, humans were better able to adapt to changes in information analysis and 
action automation rather than for more cognitively intense information analysis and 
information decision automation. 
2.3 Automation in the Aviation Domain 
When considering the automation found on the aviation flight deck, Fadden (1990) 
provided an initial distinction of aviation automation into two main categories: information 
automation, which involves the management and presentation of context-relevant 
information to the flightcrew, and control automation, which addresses the automation of 
those devices that directly impact the aerodynamics of the aircraft. Billings (1997) introduced 
a third category of automation called management automation, which deals with the efficient 
completion of a mission. While control automation is clearly distinct from information and 
management automation, further details to distinguish these latter two are necessary. 
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According to Billings (1997, p. 70), information automation is “devoted to the 
management and presentation of relevant information to flight crew members”. Examples of 
information automation systems include the following (1997, p. 88-105): 
• Attitude and flight path displays 
• Navigation displays 
• Power displays 
• Alerting and warning systems 
• Communication automation 
By contrast, management automation corresponds to the “strategic, rather than 
tactical, control of an operation” (Billings, 1997, p. 70). Management automation includes 
those functions allocated to the Flight Management System (FMS) for mission optimization 
(Billings, 1997, p. 109-110): 
• Navigation: determination of position, velocity, and wind; management of 
navigation data sources. 
• Aircraft system performance: trajectory determination, definition of guidance 
and control targets, flight path predictions; time and fuel at destination. 
• Guidance: error determination, steering, and control command generation. 
• Electronic instrument system: computation of map and situation data for 
display. 
• Control-display unit: processing of keystrokes, flight plan construction, and 
presentation of performance and flight plan data. 
• Input/output: processing of received and transmitted data. 
• Built-in test: system monitoring, self-testing, and record keeping. 
• Operating system: executive control of the operational program, memory 
management, and stored routines. 
 
Between Billings’ two lists of functions, there is an emphasis on the display, or 
presentation, of information in information automation that is not as prevalent (although still 
present) in management automation. Billings also notes the differences between information 
and management automation with respect to the types of computations performed by each 
system. Whereas management automation is heavily focused on strategic optimization tasks, 
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information automation has a focus on integration of available data sources into displays that 
aid broad functions such as task performance, decision making, and position awareness. 
To summarize, information automation differs from control automation in that 
information automation has no direct impact on the aerodynamics of the aircraft, whereas 
control automation does have direct and immediate impact. The unique distinction of 
management automation is that it is focused on the strategic, rather than tactical, control of 
the aircraft in order to optimize performance over the course of the entire mission. 
Information automation systems are therefore explicitly used for the presentation of data in a 
timely manner and at the appropriate levels of abstraction for the task at hand. 
2.4 Flight Deck Information Automation Definition and Framework 
In order to focus the effort of characterizing information automation systems, a more 
formal and comprehensive definition of information automation was needed than what had 
previously been defined by Billings. Keeping the distinctions from the previous section in 
mind, a formal definition of information automation on the flight deck was developed: 
Information automation encompasses all aspects of data collection (e.g., from sensors, 
databases, or human input), processing (filtering, prediction from models, varying levels of 
abstraction, etc.), and presentation to the human operator(s) through any appropriate 
modality (e.g., visual, auditory, and tactile). 
The three different categories of aviation automation specified by Billings (1997) and 
the four information processing stages specified by Parasuraman et al. (2000) led to the 
framework developed by Rogers, Whitlow, Letsu-Dake, Ott, and Dorneich (2013), which is 
shown in Figure 1. The horizontal dimension of the framework shows “What is controlled or 
acted upon?” The columns represent parameters similar to the aviation automation categories 
identified by Billings (1997) and reflect what the automation is controlling: the aircraft, the 
mission, or information. The leftmost column lists the “Information Processing Steps,” and 
shows what stage of information processing is being performed by the automation. The steps 
were defined using the terminology from Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act model 
(the OODA loop; Boyd, 1987). The rows of the table can be further identified as the four 
types of automation specified by Parasuraman et al. (2000): acquisition automaton (Observe), 
analysis automation (Orient), decision automation (Decide), and action automation (Act). 
 Different human factors issues are possible depending on 
being performed. 
 
Figure 1. Framework to distinguish information automation from control and management 
automation (from Rogers et al., 2013).
In the framework presented here, the definition of information automation is 
expanded to include not only the first two stages of processing, but also the final two stages if 
what is being controlled is information itself. For instance, information automation 
Orient/Information cell might provide judgments to a human operator (Bass & Pritchett, 
2008), whereas information automation in the Orient/Aircraft cell might provide input into a 
hazard mitigation system that might affect the control of the automat
information automation (specifically information analysis automation). Conversely, decision 
automation may or may not be classified as information automation. Automation in the 
Decide/Information cell that evaluates display options
information to the pilot would be information automation. Automation in the Decide/Aircraft 
12 
the stage of information processing 
 
ion. Both are considered 
 to decide the best way to convey 
 
in the 
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cell that decides on an evasive maneuver for the pilot would be considered control 
automation. 
More specifically, the framework can be used to define areas considered to be 
information automation: 
1) Early information processing stages (observe, orient) linked to control and 
management automation; 
2) All information processing stages for automation where information is the 
primary commodity being controlled, processed, and presented; and 
3) Feedback loops which present information on statuses and states for control 
and systems automation (while these loops might not be considered 
information automation per se, many similar human factors issues likely 
apply). 
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CHAPTER 3   
CHARACTERIZATION OF INFORMATION AUTOMATION 
This chapter describes the steps taken to develop a set of characteristics to describe 
information automation specific to aircraft flight deck systems. An initial brainstorming and 
categorization of information automation characteristics by Honeywell researchers is 
discussed first (Rogers et al., 2013). Their efforts laid the groundwork for the systematic 
analysis and refinement procedure performed as part of this research, which is then 
described. The goal of the characterization work was to establish a set of characteristics that 
would fully describe information automation systems on the flight deck without having any 
overlap in the characteristics; that is, each characteristic could be considered to be orthogonal 
to one another. Establishing such a set of characteristics could then allow for the 
development of metrics that could be used to objectively evaluate and compare different 
information automation system designs from a performance and usability perspective. For the 
purposes of this effort, a “characteristic” of an automated system was defined as an attribute, 
feature, or property which describes a system’s operation or behavior. 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Initial Characteristics Generation 
In addition to Honeywell’s preliminary efforts in developing a framework for 
describing information automation systems on the flight deck, they also conducted several 
activities to identify characteristics of these systems that could lead to potential human 
factors issues. These activities included brainstorming meetings, pilot interviews, meetings 
with stakeholders and other human factors experts, a review of features of existing products, 
and a review of existing FAA design guidelines and recommendations. Multiple perspectives 
were considered: 
• Products (e.g., Electronic Flight Bag applications) 
• High level flight deck functions (e.g., aviate, navigate, and communicate) 
• Flightcrew functions (e.g., communication with Air Traffic Control and Airline 
Operation Centers) 
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• Human error taxonomies (e.g., Threat & Error Management; Helmreich & 
Musson, 2000) 
• Operational environment (NextGen; FAA, 2013a) 
• Human information processing model (e.g., observe, orient, decide, act) 
• Automation human factors (e.g., Billings, 1991; Parasuraman et al., 2000; Lee 
& See, 2004) 
• Adaptive automation (e.g., Kaber et al., 2005; Feigh, Dorneich, & Hayes, 
2012) 
• Situation awareness (e.g., Endsley, 2000) 
• User experience level (e.g., Rasmussen, 1983) 
• FAA regulatory and guidance materials (e.g., Code of Federal Regulations, 
Advisory Circulars, and policy statements) 
• Flight deck automation (e.g., Landry, 2009) 
 
From these sources, the Honeywell research team generated an initial list of 130 
features and attributes of information automation systems. Although using a multitude of 
perspectives created redundancy in feature identification, this redundancy was accepted in 
exchange for a more exhaustive analysis with a low probability of missing potential issues. 
The affinity diagramming process (Beyer & Holtzblatt, 1997) was used to organize the initial 
list of features and attributes into a hierarchy revealing common issues and themes. The 
affinity was built bottom up by collaboratively organizing related items, until all items were 
placed in groups. Categories for the groups were not predefined; rather they emerged from 
the contents of each group. The resulting list of candidate characteristics were then reduced 
to ten. 
3.1.2 Characteristics Refinement 
Refining the characteristics began by generating specific definitions for the ten 
characteristics in order to further analyze their independence, or orthogonality, from one 
another. The characteristics and their definitions are shown in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2. List of candidate characteristics of information automation. 
Information 
Automation 
Candidate 
Characteristic 
Definition 
Complexity 
Level of connectivity with other flight deck functions. Number and levels of 
automation present. Number of control and display elements required to interact 
with the system. The level of difficultly to understand the functions/sub-functions 
and what their current and future behavior will be. 
Functionality 
The intended function and the type of functions and their implications for risks 
from a human factors perspective. Potential for inducing distractions or being used 
for unintended functions. Frequency of information automation system use. 
Authority 
Level of authority/autonomy the system has over decisions and actions, even if 
those decisions and actions are only at the level of what/how/when information is 
presented. Amount of compellingness or salience that induces compliance and thus 
has implicit authority. 
Level of 
Integration 
Number of other systems or components directly linked to the system that have 
data or processing dependencies. Number of other systems that need to be 
evaluated in terms of consistency of user interface elements (colors, symbology, 
formats, etc.). Pilot procedures and operations that the system supports which 
require integration of new tasks with existing procedures. 
Opacity 
Ability for pilots to understand the system’s behavior, how it is generating the 
outputs, and what sources it is using for input. Availability to verify its outputs. 
Ability to predict what it will do next. 
User 
Interaction 
Requirements 
Number and type of interaction required by the flight crew to successfully utilize 
the information automation system. Amount of head down time and/or distraction 
from other tasks. Amount of time to access information, provide inputs, or to 
interpret outputs from the system. 
Criticality Level of importance of the function that is supported from a safety perspective. Potential consequences if the system “gets it wrong.” 
Adaptiveness Dynamic behavior of the system – level of ability to adapt its output to the 
situation such that it might appear more consistent and less predictable to the user. 
Accuracy Reliability, timeliness, and accuracy of the output. Ability to support the crew task. Potential to be misleading even if technically reliable. 
Degradation 
Behavior 
Failure modes of the system. Ability to easily identify and recover from failures. 
Existence of back up ways that pilots can achieve the same functions and outputs. 
Amount of risk of subtle and insidious failures and anomalies that might go 
undetected. 
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One limitation of the approach was that it was not capable of identifying whether any 
characteristics were missed. Generating the initial list by looking at the problem through 
different perspectives was an attempt to mitigate this issue. A second limitation was the 
possibility that some of the characteristics were redundant or captured similar human factors 
aspects of information automation. The analysis method described next was employed to 
address this limitation. 
Rating Characteristics against Usability Principles 
To ensure a level of independence between each of the characteristics defined in the 
previous section, a rating and correlation analysis was performed. This procedure was used in 
Dorneich, McGrath, Dudley, and Morris (2013) for an analysis of adaptive system 
characteristics. In that work, an initial set of 26 characteristics were reduced to a core set of 
seven, the independence of which the researchers had reasonable confidence in due to the 
analytic nature of the procedure. The method was adopted for this work to address similar 
concerns about the independence of the characteristics. 
To evaluate their independence, or lack thereof, each of the characteristics were rated 
for the strength of their relation to each of the usability principles defined by Dix, Finlay, 
Abowd, and Beale (2004). These principles were chosen because they address three main 
categories of usability: learnability, flexibility, and robustness. Learnability affects the ease 
with which users can adapt their knowledge of current systems to a new interface. Flexibility 
deals with the various ways a user and system are able to exchange information. Robustness 
addresses a system’s ability to support a user in assessing and achieving the user’s goals. 
Within these three main usability categories are several principles, whose definitions are 
provided in Table 3. Together, these principles encompass all the important human-system 
interaction attributes of an interface and are therefore strong indicators for how readily an 
interface will be accepted and utilized by its users.  
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Table 3. Usability principles (from Dix et al., 2004, Ch. 7). 
Principle  Definition 
Learnability 
Predictability Support for the user to determine the effect of future action based on past 
interaction history 
Synthesizability Support for the user to assess the effect of past operations on the current state 
Familiarity The extent to which a user’s knowledge and experience in other real-world or 
computer-based domains can be applied when interacting with a new system 
Generalizability Support for the user to extend knowledge or specific interaction within and 
across applications to other similar situations 
Consistency Likeness in input-output behavior arising from similar situations or similar 
task objectives 
Flexibility 
Dialog initiative Allowing the user freedom from artificial constraints on the input dialog 
imposed by the system 
Multi-threading Ability of the system to support user interaction pertaining to more than one 
task at a time 
Task 
migratability 
The ability to pass control for the execution of a given task so that it becomes 
either internalized by the user or the system or shared between them 
Substitutivity Allowing equivalent values of input and output to be arbitrarily substituted 
for each other 
Customizability Modifiability of the user interface by the user or the system 
Robustness 
Observability Ability of the user to evaluate the internal state of the system from its 
perceivable representation 
Recoverability Ability of the user to take corrective action once an error has been recognized 
Responsiveness How the user perceives the rate of communication with the system 
Task 
conformance 
The degree to which the system services support all of the tasks the user 
wishes to perform and in the way that the user understands them 
 
19 
 
Each of the characteristics in Table 2 were rated by the strength of their relation to 
each of the usability principles in Table 3 for a 14x10 matrix, where the characteristics were 
the columns, and the usability principles were the rows. Three analysts individually rated 
each characteristic and usability principle combination (i.e., each cell of the matrix) on a 
scale of (0, 1, 3, 9). A nonlinear scale was used in order to emphasize the strength of the 
differences in the ratings. A rating of 9 represented a direct correlation where changes in the 
characteristic had a direct impact on the corresponding usability principle. A rating of 3 
represented a strong relationship between the characteristic and usability principle, but with 
at least one other factor also affecting the usability. A rating of 1 was used to describe a weak 
relationship with several other factors affecting usability. Finally, a rating of 0 represented no 
relationship. For example, the complexity characteristic has future behavior of the system as 
part of its definition, so its relation to the predictability principle would be fairly strong. 
The ratings by the three analysts were then compared and discrepant ratings 
reconciled through a series of meetings to discuss the rationale behind the individual ratings. 
It is important to note that the discrepant ratings were not averaged, rather consensus was 
reached through discussions in which example scenarios or anecdotes were considered. The 
reconciliation process allowed multiple perspectives to be considered that resulted in 
consensus between raters. In all cases, the analysts were able to reach consensus. As a 
measure of how consistent the participants were in their initial ratings, an inter-rater 
reliability analysis was also conducted. 
Following the rating and reconciliation exercises, two analyses were performed on the 
data. The first was a measure of inter-rater reliability to determine how consistent the 
analysts were in their initial ratings. The second analysis was a Pearson’s pairwise correlation 
analysis to assess the independence of each characteristic from one another. Linear 
independence of the characteristics’ ratings along the 14 dimensions of the usability 
principles was estimated via Pearson’s pairwise correlation analysis on each combination of 
characteristics. Each characteristic has 14 usability ratings. If one considers this a 1x14 
“vector”, then any two characteristics can be compared to see how similar their vectors are. 
A high correlation is an indication that two characteristics may be redundant. Similarly, high 
correlation of a characteristic to several others warrants further scrutiny to determine whether 
that characteristic should be modified, absorbed into one or more of the other characteristics, 
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or eliminated. Conversely, high correlation does not necessarily mean that a characteristic 
must be eliminated; rather, it signals areas that need further discussion. With n(n-1)/2 
possible pairwise comparisons, even a moderate number of characteristics results in a 
significant number of comparisons, so the benefit of using this analytical method was to 
quickly identify those characteristics that needed further analysis from a human factors 
perspective without having to consider every combination. 
3.1.3 Participants 
Three human factors analysts participated in this analysis. The three analysts 
averaged 9.3 (range 6-15) years of aviation systems experience. In addition, one was a 
general aviation pilot. 
3.1.4 Scope 
It is important not to overstate the role that quantification (rating) of candidate 
characteristics played in this process. The ratings allowed a systematic comparison of 
candidate characteristics from a pilot perspective, and were used to guide the qualitative 
analysis of any correlations found. After human factors analysis, some correlated 
characteristics resulted in the characteristics being combined. However, there were also cases 
in which a quantitatively high correlation, after consideration and discussion, did not lead to 
a merging of characteristics. The goal of the quantitative (rating) exercise was to identify 
those combinations of candidate characteristics that warranted closer scrutiny; only the 
qualitative analysis determined the final disposition of the characteristics. 
3.2 Results 
The final, reconciled ratings between each of the characteristics and the usability 
principles is shown in Table 4. The sums and averages for each row and column are also 
presented in the table. 
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Table 4. Reconciled ratings of characteristics against usability principles. 
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Predictability 3 1 9 3 3 1 1 1 9 3 34 3.4 
Synthesizability 3 1 9 3 3 3 1 1 3 9 36 3.6 
Familiarity 3 3 3 0 1 3 1 3 1 3 21 2.1 
Generalizability 3 9 3 0 1 3 1 3 3 3 29 2.9 
Consistency 3 9 9 0 3 1 1 3 3 3 35 3.5 
Dialog Initiative 1 1 1 1 0 3 1 3 1 0 12 1.2 
Multi-threading 3 3 1 1 1 3 0 3 3 0 18 1.8 
Task Migratability 1 3 3 3 0 3 9 3 9 1 35 3.5 
Substitutivity 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 3 1 0 8 0.8 
Customizability 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 9 9 1 30 3 
Observability 9 1 9 3 1 3 3 1 3 9 42 4.2 
Recoverability 3 3 3 3 3 9 3 3 3 9 42 4.2 
Responsiveness 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 9 1 3 24 2.4 
Task Conformance 3 3 3 9 9 9 1 1 9 3 50 5 
Sum 37 40 58 30 27 46 27 46 58 47 
Average 2.64 2.86 4.14 2.14 1.93 3.29 1.93 3.29 4.14 3.36 
 
3.2.1 Inter-rater reliability 
A measure of inter-rater reliability is helpful to understand the consistency of the 
participants’ initial ratings. Inter-rater reliability was assessed by comparing each individual 
rating to the final reconciled rating and counting the number of “steps” between them. For 
instance, if a participant rated a cell as 9, a final rating of 3 would be one step away; a final 
rating of 1 would be two steps away; and a final rating of 0 would be three steps away. This 
method provides a conservative measure of the rate of agreement between participants. For 
 example, a set of ratings (3,3,1) may have been reconciled to a “1,” so two participants were 
one step away from the final rating even though those two agreed with each other ini
The final ratings matched 52.4% of the participants’ initial ratings. Cumulatively, 
93.3% of the participants’ initial ratings were within 1 step of the final rating 
indicating that the reconciliation process to produce the final ratings started with a strong 
basis of agreement between analysts
 
Figure 2
 
3.2.2 Pearson’s rank correlation
The Pearson’s rank correlation 
Table 5. Correlations over 0.5 
between 0.3 and 0.5 (typically considered weakly correlated) 
between 0.0 and 0.3 are in gray font. Since the relation between usability principle and 
characteristic is not symmetrical (i.e. a neg
correlations below zero are blank.
characteristic, which is the average of the correlations in the column above the diagonal cell 
element (denoted by “x”) and the correlations in the row to the right of the diagonal element. 
As an example, Table 5 has the column/row combination for the Complexity characteristic 
outlined in bold. 
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. Participant rating match with final ratings. 
 
for all combinations of characteristics is shown in 
(typically considered strong) are in bold font. 
are in normal font. 
ative correlation does not imply any relation), any 
 The final column is the “average correlation” for any one 
tially. 
(see Figure 2), 
 
Correlations 
Correlations 
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Table 5. Pearson’s rank correlation analysis, sorted from highest average correlation to lowest. 
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Criticality x .80 .29 .64 .19 .13 .53 .13 
  
.27 
Accuracy 
 
x .27 .64 .18 .25 .43 
 
.12 
 
.27 
Degradation Behavior 
  
x .37 .66 .62 
 
.02 
  
.22 
Functionality 
   
x .16 
 
.25 .11 .01 
 
.22 
Complexity 
    
x .61 
  
.07 
 
.19 
Opacity 
     
x .10 
 
.12 
 
.18 
Adaptiveness 
      
x .47 
  
.18 
Authority 
       
x 
 
.06 .08 
Level of Integration 
        
x 
 
.03 
User Interaction 
Requirements          
x .01 
 
3.3 Analysis 
The correlations were analyzed in two ways. The first was to look at the single 
pairwise correlation. If two characteristics were highly correlated, then perhaps one could be 
eliminated as redundant, or the two could be combined into a single, more comprehensive 
characteristic. The data were also analyzed to study how much correlation there was between 
a single characteristic and all others as indicated by the “Average Correlation” in Table 5. In 
all cases correlations were used as indicators of necessary further discussion. A correlation 
by itself was not enough to eliminate a characteristic; a human factors basis for making a 
change to the characteristics was required. 
Figure 3 illustrates the correlations between criticality, accuracy, and functionality. 
After discussion and analysis, it was decided that the relevant contextual aspects of task 
functionality and task criticality were supported by the quality of the information in the 
system (i.e. accuracy), and thus functionality and criticality were incorporated with accuracy 
 into the more broad characteristic 
includes the confidence that information meets intrinsic
(including criticality and functionality)
requirements. 
Figure 3. Correlations of accuracy, functionality, and criticality.
The next analysis considered the correlations between the characteristics of 
degradation behavior, opacity, and complexity 
considered a system characteristic, where
the interaction between the system and the human. Both were retained, although opacity was 
renamed Automation Visibility
included both the functional complexity of information processing, as well as the level 
complexity of information presentation. Complexity at the functional level was considered a 
system property, while complexity at the display level was considered more of a human
automation property. Rather than combining complexity with the other characteristics, it was 
split into two characteristics: 
example of how the correlation method serves a triage 
analysis is needed. In this case
result in any candidate characteristics being eliminated.
Figure 4. Correlations of opacity, degradation behavior, and
Authority was somewhat correlated (0.47) with adaptiveness. Authority is an 
emergent property of the function allocation, while adaptiveness of the system includes the 
function allocation. Therefore authority was eliminated as a redundant char
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of Information Quality (Wang & Strong, 1996)
 (including accuracy)
, representational, and accessibility quality 
 
(see Figure 4. Degradation behavior was 
as opacity was considered a characteristic related to 
 (e.g., Andre & Cutler, 1998; Bisantz et al., 2005). 
Functional Complexity and Display Complexity
method to identify area
, the analysis sparked by the high correlation results
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acteristic.
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, contextual 
 
Complexity 
of 
-
. This is a good 
s where further 
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Finally, the analysis also revealed a natural grouping of characteristics between those 
associated with the automated system itself, and those associated with the interaction 
between the human and the system. Table 6 shows the final set of characteristics with their 
definitions grouped under these headings. 
Table 6. Final set of information automation characteristics. 
Information 
Automation 
Processing 
Characteristics 
Definition 
Functional Complexity 
The complexity of the underlying processing and mode logic, and the 
understandability of functions and sub-functions. 
Information Quality 
The degree to which the information is fit for use; that is, the level of accuracy, 
completeness, timeliness, and so on, that can affect whether the information can be 
reliably used for the pilot task that it is intended to support. 
Adaptiveness 
How dynamic the system is – the degree to which it adapts its functionality, 
interaction, content, or task priorities to the situation such that it might appear less 
consistent and predictable to the user. The level of authority the system has over 
decisions and actions to adapt its behavior. 
Level of integration 
The number of other systems or components that are directly linked to the 
information automation system and have data or processing dependencies. The 
number of other systems that need to be evaluated in terms of consistency of user 
interface elements (colors, symbology, formats, etc.). The number of pilot 
procedures and operations that the information automation system supports which 
require integration of new tasks with existing procedures. 
Degradation Behavior 
The ways the system can fail or degrade. The degree to which the failure modes are 
easily detectable, easily reversible, and easily recoverable. The existence of back up 
ways the pilots can achieve the same functions and outputs. The level of risks of 
subtle and insidious failures and anomalies that might go undetected. 
Human-Information 
Automation 
Interaction 
Characteristics 
Definition 
Display Complexity 
The number of control and display elements that are used to interact with the 
system. The amount, variety, and organization of display elements that affect the 
pilot's ability to perceive, analyze, and act upon information. 
Automation Visibility 
The degree to which information is available to assist the user in understanding the 
system’s behavior. The means by which the system provides information to allow 
the pilot to understand what sources of information the system uses as input, what 
reasoning it is using, and how it is generating the outputs. The methods provided to 
allow the flightcrew to verify its outputs and to predict what it will do next. 
User Interaction 
Requirements 
The amount and type of interaction that is required by the flightcrew to utilize the 
information automation system. 
Compellingness 
The level of attention and engagement that a system attracts (Wickens, Fadden, 
Merwin, & Ververs, 1998; Wickens & Alexander, 2009). 
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3.4 Summary 
This chapter summarized the development of a formal definition and framework to 
describe information automation in the aviation domain. After an initial list of characteristics 
was developed, three research participants rated the relation of each characteristic to 14 
usability principles. A Pearson’s rank correlation analysis was then done in order to assess 
the independence of the characteristics. Where there was strong correlation among the 
characteristics, the analysis continued by considering the relationship(s) of the characteristics 
to one another from a systems and human factors perspective. Nine final characteristics were 
defined and grouped into system specific characteristics and human-system interaction 
characteristics. Some characteristics were eliminated, and (when appropriate), new 
characteristics were created to absorb or modify existing ones. The next chapter focuses on 
experimental evaluation of three of these characteristics: Information Quality, Automation 
Visibility, and Display Complexity. 
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CHAPTER 4   
INFORMATION QUALITY, AUTOMATION VISIBILITY, AND COMPLEXITY 
This chapter shifts the focus of the research to three characteristics of particular 
interest to FAA stakeholders: Information Quality, Automation Visibility, and Complexity. 
These three areas are recurring themes in the PARC/CAST Flight Deck Automation Working 
Group report (FAA, 2013b) and were deemed the highest priority for initial experimental 
study through a series of meetings between the researcher team, FAA program managers, and 
FAA technical sponsors. Some background information about these research areas as they 
relate to aviation and other complex domains is presented in order to inform a design of 
experiments. The details of the experiment and the results are reported and discussed in detail 
in Chapters 5 through 7. 
4.1 Information Quality 
Much of the previous research in what is referred to as Information Quality originated 
in database administration and management of information systems (Reeves & Bednar, 1994; 
Wang & Strong, 1996; Myers, Kappelman, & Prybutok, 1997; Pipino, Lee, & Wang, 2002; 
Stvilia, Gasser, Twidale, & Smith, 2007; Batini, Cappiello, Francalanci, & Maurino, 2009). 
In this domain, there are several factors that play an important part in the overall concept of 
information quality. For example, Wang and Strong (1996) identified four properties of high 
quality data: 1) intrinsically good, 2) contextually appropriate for the task, 3) clearly 
represented, and 4) accessible to the data consumer. They further identified 15 separate 
dimensions that fit within these four categories of information quality (see Table 7) in an 
effort to capture more comprehensively the usefulness of information as a product, or 
commodity, to the consumers who seek it. 
Table 7. Categories and dimensions of information quality (Wang & Strong, 1996). 
Intrinsically Good 
 
Contextually Appropriate 
for the Task 
Clearly Represented Accessible to the 
Data Consumer 
Believability 
Accuracy 
Objectivity 
Reputation 
Value-added 
Relevancy 
Timeliness 
Completeness 
Appropriate amount of data 
Interpretability 
Ease of understanding 
Representational consistency 
Concise representation 
Accessibility 
Access security 
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English (2009) provided other components of information quality that covered similar 
underlying concerns, but in different groupings. These groupings were defined as: 1) quality 
of information product specification data, 2) quality of information content, 3) quality of 
information presentation, and 4) quality culture. 
This categories and dimensions of information quality provided by Wang and Strong 
(1996) are directly relevant to pilots as consumers of the information provided by flight deck 
information automation systems and were therefore adopted for the experimental study. For 
example, automatic decluttering of a display based on the phase of flight and a predetermined 
set of criteria is a feature of adaptive automation that aims to provide pilots with only the 
most relevant and timely information for a given situation (Billings & Woods, 1994). A 
concern with this functionality, however, is whether the system is able to determine and 
provide all of the relevant information needed by the pilot for a given situation. 
In the development of the experiments on information quality, several dimensions 
(e.g. accuracy, timeliness) could be manipulated. For example, introducing a delay in 
presented information would address the timeliness dimension. Furthermore, performance 
differences resulting from such manipulations may lead to recommendations for specific 
information quality dimensions. 
4.2 Automation Visibility 
Information automation visibility (sometimes also called “mode awareness” or 
“observability” in the literature – for example, Sarter and Woods, 1995; Woods, 1996; and 
Mosier et al., 2013) refers to the ability of an automation system to provide adequate 
feedback about its current state, what information is being used, and how the information is 
being processed (Endsley, 1996; Whitlow, Dorneich, Funk, & Miller, 2002). This 
characteristic may also be referred to as opacity (e.g., Andre & Cutler, 1998; Bisantz et al., 
2005). In order for information automation to be visible, the feedback must provide a view 
into the automation’s state and activities in a manner which can be properly interpreted by 
the operator (Woods, 1996) and allows the operator to predict its behavior (Scerbo, 1996). 
In information automation systems that aid operators in decision-making tasks, good 
automation visibility would mean the system is effectively communicating what information 
it is using and how it is using that information to derive its recommendations. Many studies 
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have shown that providing meta-information and/or strategy information to operators 
improves task performance and error catching. For example, Seong and Bisantz (2008) found 
improvements in an air traffic identification task when the automation provided meta-
information related to how the system applied a cue-weighting strategy to input data to come 
up with its judgments vs. providing its judgments without the underlying strategy. Other 
studies have shown decreased reaction times to alerts, along with improved responses to the 
alerts, when the automations’ strategies were provided to operators when compared to the 
performance when strategies were not shown (e.g., Pritchett & Vándor, 2001; Sarter & 
Woods, 1992 and 1994a; and Skjerve & Skraaning, 2004). Building on these observations, 
Bass, Baumgart, and Shepley (2013) showed that judgment performance improvements could 
also be found in noisy environments when uncertainty information about the sensors that fed 
data to both the automation and the operators was provided as compared to the performance 
when operators were provided only the automation’s judgment. 
Highly automated systems that have low automation visibility may appear to the 
operator to be a completely autonomous agent, capable of its own independent actions. This 
is known as “perceived animacy” of the automated system (Sarter & Woods, 1994a) and on 
the flight deck can result in pilots having difficulty understanding system behavior when 
changing conditions cause a mode change that is not communicated effectively (Sarter & 
Woods, 1994b, 1995). For example, if a Flight Management System changes automation 
modes when a preprogrammed target altitude is reached and this change is poorly (or not at 
all) communicated, the pilot may perceive the system as acting on its own and wondering 
what its next actions will be. These situations of automation surprise are exacerbated as 
system complexity increases (Woods, 1996). 
On the other hand, systems that have inappropriately high automation visibility may 
cause information overload (Deveans & Kewley, 2009; Degani, Barshi, & Shafto, 2013). 
Faced with an overwhelming amount of data, pilots may not be able to absorb the 
information presented to them and they run the risk of loss or reduction of situation 
awareness (Endsley, 1999, 2010; Wickens, 2002). 
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4.3 Complexity 
From the previous work in defining the characteristics of information automation 
systems, two different complexity characteristics were identified: functional complexity and 
display complexity. The experimental study presented here focused on display complexity. 
This section gives an overview of complexity (in general) from the literature, followed by the 
dimensions and metrics adopted for measuring display complexity (specifically) of an 
information automation system. 
The literature on complexity lacks a consensus on the definition of the term, although 
similar components in human-system interfaces have been identified (Cummings, 
Sasangohar, Thornburg, Xing, & D’Agostino, 2010). Three separate dimensions have been 
specifically recognized: quantity of basic information elements, variety of the elements, and 
the relations between the elements. 
Boy (2008) interpreted perceived complexity as “complexity of an equipment or 
system in the flight deck as perceived by the pilot” (p. 8). He identified a broad range of 
issues related to artifact, user experience, task, organization, and situation complexities. 
Many of these components of perceived complexity relate closely to the usability principles 
given by Dix et al. (2004) used in refining the candidate information automation 
characteristics (see Table 3 in section 3.1.2). For example, artifact complexity is related to 
flexibility and task complexity includes consistency. Finally, Boy (2008) also points out that 
the main difficulty in measuring complexity is that it is related to expertise. Within this 
framework, then, complexity is a subjective measure that will likely vary from pilot to pilot. 
However, an objective measure of complexity for information automation systems on 
the flight deck may be possible through the work by Xing (2007, 2008) in the domain of air 
traffic control systems. Xing first developed a framework for display complexity (Xing, 
2007) and then developed a set of questionnaires to measure this type of complexity in air 
traffic control displays (2008). The wording in the questionnaires is sufficiently generic to be 
used in the evaluation of other types of displays as well. The framework consists of three 
basic factors: quantity, variety, and relation of information. Each of these factors is evaluated 
along three of the information processing stages: perception, cognition, and action. 
Additionally, the metrics are derived by associating the three complexity factors with the 
information processing stage (see Table 8). 
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Table 8. Display complexity dimensions and metrics as defined by Xing (2007). 
 Perception Cognition Action 
Quantity No. of fixation groups No. of functional units Amount of action cost 
Variety No. of visual features Dynamic complexity Action depth 
Relation Degree of clutter Relational complexity No. of action goals 
 
A multiple choice questionnaire was developed by Xing (2008) for quantitative 
evaluation of complexity of air traffic control displays. The questionnaire consists of a total 
of 13 questions: one question for each of the nine combinations of Table 8, followed by one 
question for each of the information processing stages (perception, cognition, and action), 
and a final question to address the overall display complexity. For each question, participants 
assigned one of the following four levels of complexity: 1) not complex, easy to use; 2) 
moderately complex but manageable; 3) complex and manageable only when not busy; 4) 
too complex to manage. 
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CHAPTER 5   
EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
This chapter provides details of the experimental evaluation of varying levels of 
information quality, automation visibility, and display complexity on decision-making 
performance. The goal of the investigation is to gain insight into decision-making 
performance effects when these information automation system characteristics are 
manipulated. Understanding these effects will help establish design recommendations and 
guidelines for information automation systems. 
5.1 Research Objectives 
The goal of the experimental study was to show measurable differences in 
performance and other subjective assessment metrics when manipulating the information 
automation characteristics of information quality, automation visibility, and display modality. 
5.2 Hypotheses 
The evaluation is based on a premise that automation visibility will have an impact on 
the ability of pilots to detect problems resulting from poor information quality. The effect of 
display modality is also studied. Specifically, the hypotheses tested in the study were: 
1. Increased information automation visibility will result in increased primary task 
performance, increased confidence in decisions, and increased trust in automation, 
but at a cost of higher workload. 
2. Higher information quality will result in better primary task performance when 
compared to lower information quality. 
3. Higher automation visibility will result in increased ability for pilots to 
compensate for poor information quality in the automation to maintain overall 
primary task performance (i.e., the difference in primary task performance 
between the low and high information quality conditions will be greater when 
automation visibility is low than when the visibility is high). 
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4. The graphical display will result in increased task performance, increased 
detection of information quality issues, lower complexity, and lower workload 
when compared with the text display. 
5.3 Participants 
Honeywell obtained Internal Review Board (IRB) approval for the study and 
recruited twelve airline transport pilots from a cross section of regional and major airlines to 
participate. All participants were right-handed males and one was color blind. Participants 
averaged 34.2 years of age (range: 24-56). Seven participants were First Officers and five 
were Captains. The average number of flight hours among the participants was 7000 (range: 
2000 – 14,000). Seven of the pilots had no experience with electronic flight bags, four had 
some experience, and one used an electronic flight bags in his daily work. Participants rated 
their familiarity with glass cockpits as 4.9 of a 5-point scale (standard deviation 0.3). Also on 
a 5 point scale, participants rated their level of trust in automation at 3.83, with 1 being no 
trust and 5 being complete trust in automation (standard deviation 0.55). Finally, the pilots 
were asked about their level of authority in making decisions about diversions, with 1 being 
they had no authority and 5 being that they had complete authority. The average response 
among the pilots was 4.08 and the standard deviation was 1.08. 
5.4 Experiment Task: Diversion Decision-Making 
For this experiment, participants used an information automation system designed to 
aid in-flight diversion decision making. This section provides some background on diversion 
and a brief introduction to the task assigned to participants. 
5.4.1 Background 
Historically, diversion decisions have been a collaborative effort between the pilot 
and airline dispatchers. As more information becomes available on the flight deck with 
NextGen capabilities, the balance of responsibility for diversion decisions may shift more 
toward pilots. The primary goal of this task is to ensure that the plane is diverted safely. 
Secondary goals may include minimized downstream disruptions to airline operations. 
Experienced dispatchers know that diversion decisions have significant impact on 
downstream airline operations, including the schedules for aircraft, crew, maintenance, and 
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passengers (Dorneich, Whitlow, Miller, & Allen, 2004). In future operations, pilots may be 
expected to take a more active role in considering these aspects of diversion decisions. 
For this study, participants were tasked with making a diversion decision based on the 
assumption that the diversion decision making tool had already considered all aspects of the 
flight related to safety, such as remaining fuel and runway lengths at the suggested diversion 
airports. As such, they were to focus on the consequences of the diversion options from an 
airline operations perspective. This was a modified way for pilots to consider the diversion 
decision-making task for two reasons: 1) they were to assume the safety requirements were 
met by the automation, and 2) they were not coordinating with airline dispatchers. 
From the perspective of the dispatcher, diversion decisions consist of two parts: 
which of the in-flight aircraft are to be diverted, and to which airports they are diverted. 
These two decisions can have dramatic consequences in the disruption of an airline’s four 
inter-linked schedules: aircraft, crew, maintenance, and passenger schedules. 
There are other stakeholders in diversion decisions; however, the diversion decision is 
made by only the pilot and the dispatcher. In addition, there is very little time available to 
produce a diversion plan, which one dispatcher characterized as “0-10 minutes” (Dorneich et 
al., 2004). The relevant information about how a candidate plan will affect various schedules 
and their stakeholders is distributed across multiple systems and departments. Consequently, 
in current practice the decision is almost solely based on fuel limits and other aspects of 
aircraft safety. There are typically several different diversion plans possible that will 
maintain safe flight and landing profiles, but differ widely in their impact on airline 
operations, profits, crew and staff convenience, and customer satisfaction. 
5.4.2 Policies 
A set of company policy statements was established to represent the operational 
priorities of all stakeholders affected by diversion decisions. These policies are used to assess 
the overall “goodness” of a diversion plan. Each policy was associated with cost points 
operational for each statement that is violated by a particular plan. The policy statements are 
shown in Table 9. For example, diverting a flight with an unaccompanied minor costs 10 
points, while delaying a flight greater than 15 minutes costs 8 points. The policy statements 
are adapted from a list of policy statements developed by Dorneich et al. (2004) after 
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conducting interviews with airline dispatchers as well as various stakeholders. The goal of 
selecting a diversion option is to minimize the total cost incurred by the selected option. The 
lower the cost, the better the plan. 
Table 9. Policy statements and their corresponding cost values. 
Policy Statement Cost 
Do not exceed crew duty limits 10 
Do not divert a flight with an unaccompanied minor 10 
Do not divert a flight with an arriving international passenger to an airport 
that does not have passport control 10 
Do not divert passengers connecting to an international flight 8 
Do not delay flights greater than 15 minutes 8 
Do not divert to an airport that has its maximum capacity of aircraft 8 
Do not cause crew to miss next flight assignment 5 
Do not cause passengers to fail to reach destination 3 
 
5.4.3 Diversion Aid 
An information automation tool, the Diversion Aid, was created for the purposes of 
the study. The Diversion Aid integrates multiple information sources to provide participants 
with data on the current state of flight, aircraft, maintenance, crew, and passenger schedules. 
By capturing and showing the implications of diversion decisions to the participant, it was 
anticipated that s/he would be better able to integrate the goals and priorities of interested 
airline operations stakeholders into the decision making process. 
5.4.4 Displays 
The Diversion Aid presented the original scheduled flight plan, followed by its 
diversion plan recommendations to the participants in one of three ways (automation 
visibility options), depending on the experimental condition. Additionally, the Diversion Aid 
was presented in one of two display modes: text or graphic. The text and graphic displays 
 were designed such that the information content was identical between the 
Figures 5 and 6 show annotated descriptions of the text and graphic displays, respectively.
The automation visibility options were:
• Low Visibility
• Medium Visibility: A ranked list of the top three 
• High Visibility: A ranked list of the top three options with the cost values
shown (see Figure 8
Figure 5. Annotated Diversion
display form: (a) overall display example shown to participants; (b) description of schedule 
information presented in the displays
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two modes.
 
: A single best option (see Figures 5 and 6) 
options (see 
). 
 Aid presenting options with low automation visibility 
. 
 
 
Figure 7) 
 
 
in text 
 Figure 6. Annotated Diversion Aid presenting
display form: (a) overall display example shown to participants; (b) description of schedule 
information presented in the displays
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 options with low automation visibility in graphic 
. 
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 (text) (graphic) 
Figure 7. Diversion Aid presenting options with medium automation visibility in text and 
graphic display forms. 
 
  
 (text) (graphic) 
Figure 8. Diversion Aid presenting options with high automation visibility in text and graphic 
display forms. 
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5.5 Tasks / Scenarios 
Participants performed two tasks for the experiment: the primary task was to select or 
reject a diversion plan with the help of the Diversion Aid, and the secondary task was to 
report traffic as it appeared in an out-the-window display. In every trial, participants knew 
they would be diverted, but did not know when in the scenario they would be instructed to 
divert. 
Participants acted as the Pilot Monitoring and performed six trials, each with a unique 
scenario that represented a typical crew schedule for one day, including up to one crew 
transfer to another aircraft (tail number). In an abbreviated pre-flight briefing, the confederate 
pilot reviewed the schedule for the day, weather, and a pre-planned diversion airport with the 
participant. These briefings contained both relevant and irrelevant information specific to the 
diversion task, in order to provide the information that might be needed to make a correct 
decision without explicitly stating that the information would be required. Participants were 
informed that the Diversion Aid may not always have the most current or correct 
information, in an attempt to appropriately calibrate trust. Participants were also told that the 
briefings had the most accurate and up-to-date information and they, as pilots, had the final 
authority in the diversion decision. 
5.4.5 Primary Task 
A flight simulation was presented to the participants to help provide a sense of 
realism to the trials. The simulation began approximately ten minutes from top of decent 
After 60 to 90 seconds, the need for a diversion was announced and the participant was asked 
to make a recommendation within five minutes. The participant then started the Diversion 
Aid, reviewed its recommended plan(s), and decided whether to accept one of the plans or to 
reject its recommendation(s) if he felt he could devise a better plan. The participant did not 
need to create a different plan. A help menu was available that displayed the set of policies 
(see Table 9). 
5.4.6 Secondary Task 
A secondary task of reporting traffic in a simulated out the window view was also 
assigned in order to increase workload during the diversion selection task. Traffic appeared 
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out the window (see Figure 9) in random locations at random times and did not move. Every 
five seconds, the probability of traffic being displayed was 60% (a set point determined 
during pre-experimental dry runs). If traffic did appear, it remained in the view until 
participants reported it by pressing a button (usually held in their non-dominant hand). If they 
failed to press the button after five seconds, the target would disappear. Participants were 
instructed to press the button as soon as they saw the traffic. While reviewing the Diversion 
Aid’s recommendations, the participant continued reporting out-the-window traffic. 
 
Figure 9. Simulated out the window view with traffic. 
5.6 Independent Variables 
In addition to the two Display Modes and the three Automation Visibility levels, 
Information Quality was also an independent variable in the experiment. The independent 
variables are summarized in Table 10. 
Table 10. Independent variables for the experimental study. 
Independent Variable Levels Description 
Information Quality Low Some relevant information was not included in the 
calculation of total diversion decision cost 
 High All relevant information was included in the calculation 
of total diversion decision cost 
Automation Visibility Low Best option only 
 Medium Rank-ordered list of the three best options 
 High Rank-ordered list with the costs shown 
Display Mode Text Plan information was displayed in text form 
 Graphic Plan information was displayed in graphic form 
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5.7 Dependent Variables 
Table 11 shows the dependent variables that were measured. 
Table 11. Dependent variables and the metrics used to measure them. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Metric 
Measurement 
/ Unit 
Frequency of 
Collection 
Data Type 
Decision 
Performance 
Time to make a selection seconds once per trial ratio 
Decision 
Performance 
Selection of best plan yes/no once per trial 
binary 
ordinal 
Workload 
TLX measures: 
     a) Mental Demand 
     b) Physical Demand 
     c) Temporal Demand 
     d) Performance 
     e) Effort 
     f) Frustration 
0 - 10 once per trial 
subjective 
ordinal 
Workload Ratio of detected vs. all targets % 
2x per trial - before 
and after diversion 
selection task 
continuous 
Attention 
Allocation 
Time spent on primary and 
secondary displays (app vs. out 
the window) 
seconds once per trial ratio 
Confidence 
Survey question: Confidence in 
decision 
1 - 5 once per trial 
subjective 
ordinal 
Automation 
Awareness 
Survey question: 
Understanding of automation 
1 - 5 once per trial 
subjective 
ordinal 
Trust 
Survey question: Trust in 
automation 
1 - 5 once per trial 
subjective 
ordinal 
Display 
Complexity 
Survey questions on complexity: 
 a) Perception - Quantity 
 b) Cognition - Relation 
 c) Overall Perceptual Complexity 
1 - 4 once per trial 
subjective 
ordinal 
 
Decision Performance was measured via the time to make a diversion decision, and 
the correctness of the decision. Time to make a decision was the elapsed time from the start 
of the Diversion Aid until participants made their diversion plan selection. Participants were 
asked to select a diversion plan from the options presented by the Diversion Aid, or to reject 
all options if they felt that there was a better plan. Plan selection performance was scored as a 
1 if the participant selected the best plan that resulted in the least cost according to the policy 
statements. If the best plan was not selected, the result was 0. In the high Information Quality 
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condition, the correct selection was always the top option on the display. In the low 
Information Quality condition, the automation was missing information that resulted in 
incorrect scoring of the options. Participants were briefed earlier and possessed this missing 
information. Thus in the low Information Quality conditions, the automation’s highest ranked 
plan was not actually the best plan – participants were expected to recognize that a different 
plan was better once they included the missing information into to their assessment. They 
could also reject all the plans shown if they felt that the options shown were flawed. In the 
medium and high Automation Visibility conditions for the low Information Quality trials, 
this means that the actual best plan (correct selection) was listed below the automation’s 
highest ranked plan; in the low Automation Visibility condition, there was only one option 
shown by the automation, so if the participant recognized that there was missing information, 
he could choose to reject the plan. 
Workload while selecting a diversion plan was measured two ways. The first was 
subjective workload measured via the NASA-TLX questionnaire (Hart & Staveland, 1988), 
which assessed workload along six dimensions that were summed to arrive at a total 
workload value. The second measure was an objective measurement of workload based on 
performance of the secondary task of reporting traffic detected in an out-the-window view. 
Attention allocation was estimated using head-tracking data to calculating the 
percentage of time the participant spent looking at the Diversion Aid while selecting a plan. 
Confidence, Automation Awareness, Trust, and Display Complexity were measured 
via a post-trial questionnaire (see APPENDIX A). The Automation Awareness question 
asked participants to provide their level of understanding of how the Diversion Aid arrived at 
its recommendations. Three survey questions from Xing (2008) were used to assess 
participants’ opinions on the complexity of the displays. 
A post-experiment questionnaire was also administered (see APPENDIX B) to collect 
participants’ qualitative responses regarding automation visibility, addressing what strategies 
they used to come up with their decision, what they liked, and what they would improve. 
Participants were asked to rate their relative preference between the three automation 
visibility levels by distributing a total 100 points for each of the following five attributes 
(with more points indicating higher preference): 
• Clarity of information 
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• Completeness of information 
• Ease of finding information 
• Helpfulness in making a decision 
• Preference 
For example, a participant might allocate the following point for the “Completeness 
of information” attribute: 20 for low automation visibility, 30 for medium, and 50 for high. 
5.8 Experimental Design 
The experiment was designed as a 2 (Information Quality) x 3 (Automation 
Visibility) x 2 (Display Mode). Display mode was a between subjects variable, so 
participants saw either the text or graphic display mode, but not both. Information Quality 
and Automation Visibility were manipulated within subjects. Table 12 shows the treatment 
assignments for the participants. The odd numbered participants saw the text display while 
the even numbered participants saw the graphic display. 
Table 12. Treatment assignments for each of the twelve participants. Odd numbered 
participants saw the text display while the even numbered participants saw the graphic display. 
Scen-
ario 
Participant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Treatment             
 Visibility High High Low Low Med Med Low Low High High Med Med 
1 Info Quality Low Low High High Low Low Low Low High High High High 
 Display Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic 
 Visibility Low Low Med Med High High High High Med Med Low Low 
2 Info Quality High High Low Low High High Low Low High High Low Low 
 Display Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic 
 Visibility Med Med High High Low Low Med Med Low Low High High 
3 Info Quality Low Low High High High High High High Low Low Low Low 
 Display Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic 
 Visibility Low Low Med Med High High High High Med Med Low Low 
4 Info Quality Low Low High High Low Low High High Low Low High High 
 Display Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic 
 Visibility Med Med High High Low Low Med Med Low Low High High 
5 Info Quality High High Low Low Low Low Low Low High High High High 
 Display Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic 
 Visibility High High Low Low Med Med Low Low High High Med Med 
6 Info Quality High High Low Low High High High High Low Low Low Low 
 Display Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic Text Graphic 
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The order of the scenarios were counterbalanced across participants to avoid learning 
effects that might otherwise have been associated with the scenario number. 
5.9 Testing Environment 
The evaluation was conducted in a low fidelity flight simulator in a Honeywell 
facility in Golden Valley, MN. Figure 10 shows the general layout of the simulator. 
Microsoft® Flight Simulator X (FSX) was used for the flight simulation. An InterSense® 
InertiaCube2 head tracker was used to measure percent time spent looking at different 
displays (Figure 11). A video camera was used to record participant interactions with the 
information automation applications. 
 
Figure 10. Low fidelity simulator layout. 
 
Figure 11. Head tracker. 
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5.10 Procedure 
Upon arrival, each participant was first given an initial briefing of the days’ activities 
and a consent form to read and sign. A questionnaire was then given to gather demographics, 
piloting experience, use of electronic flight bags, and general attitudes toward automation. 
Following the preliminary paperwork, participants were trained on the use of the 
Diversion Aid, the tasks they would be asked to perform, and the post-trial questionnaires 
they would complete. The first part of the training was conducted outside the simulator, with 
the experimenter reading a script while stepping through training slides that followed the 
script in order to provide all participants with the same information. The training included 
stop points at which the participants were asked to explain what information was being 
shown in the aid to ensure they had a reasonable understanding of how the aid calculated and 
presented its recommendations. The questionnaires that would be administered after each 
trial were also given to the participants so they could practice completing them before 
starting the trials. 
The second part of the training was performed in the simulator by working through a 
training scenario with step-by-step instructions given. The conditions for the training 
scenario were set to high Information Quality and high Automation Visibility. Upon 
completion of the training scenario, if participants were able to make a diversion plan 
selection within a five minute time limit, it was determined that their performance was 
satisfactory and the actual trials began. If they required more than five minutes or still felt 
unsure about the task, the training scenario was repeated. 
Participants completed a total of six different diversion scenarios in the simulator. 
After making each diversion decision, they filled out the NASA-TLX workload scale and 
post-trial questionnaire for each scenario. After all six scenarios were completed, participants 
filled out a post-experiment questionnaire and were provided a short debrief of the 
experiment. 
5.4.7 Limitations and Assumptions 
One limitation of the study was that the task required pilots to think about diversions 
in a completely different way than how they are used to handling them. Training, repeated 
46 
 
reminders, and practice runs were used to orient them to the Diversion Aid and all pilots 
were able to accomplish the tasks. 
A second limitation of the study was the limited number of participants. Given the 
2x3x2 experimental design and only 12 participants, statistical power of the experiment was 
anticipated to be low. The data was analyzed for statistical significance. 
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CHAPTER 6   
RESULTS 
Due to the limited number of participants and the relatively high number of 
manipulations (2x2x3), potential significance of the independent variables on each of the 
dependent variables was first investigated through a Least Squares analysis, with significance 
threshold alpha = 0.05 and marginal threshold alpha = 0.1. The initial statistical analysis of 
the Display Mode manipulation did not reveal significant results, so this independent variable 
dimension was collapsed in order to increase the power of the analysis. 
 Potential significance of the independent variables on each of the dependent 
variables was investigated through a repeated measures analysis of variance, where 
Information Quality and Information Automation Visibility were treated as the repeated 
measures. Results were considered significant for a threshold set to alpha = 0.05, and 
marginally significant for a threshold of alpha = 0.1. Table 13 shows a summary of the p-
values, with the significant and marginally significant results in bold font and noted with (*) 
and (m), respectively. Detailed results of the significant and marginally significant results are 
presented in the following subsections. 
Table 13. Summary of p-values; (*) indicates a significant result, (m) indicates a marginally 
significant result. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Metric 
Automation 
Visibility 
Information 
Quality 
Automation 
Visibility  
Information 
Quality 
Decision 
Performance 
Selection of best plan .734 .00013 (*) .534 
Decision 
Performance 
Time to make a selection .042 (*) .118 .649 
Subjective 
Workload 
TLX Total Workload .160 .463 .161 
Individual TLX measures: 
     a) Mental Demand 
     b) Physical Demand 
     c) Temporal Demand 
     d) Performance 
     e) Effort 
     f) Frustration 
 
.0511 (m) 
.146 
.022 (*) 
.913 
.119 
.670 
 
.300 
.261 
.634 
.920 
.893 
.529 
 
.122 
.214 
.889 
.050 (*) 
.649 
.310 
 Dependent 
Variable 
Metric 
Objective 
Workload 
Ratio of detected vs. all targets
Attention 
Allocation 
Time spent on primary and secondary
displays (app vs. out the window)
Confidence 
Survey question: Confidence in 
decision 
Automation 
Awareness 
Survey question: Understanding of 
automation 
Trust Survey question: Trust in 
 
6.1.1 Plan Selection 
This measure was the percentage of trials that the participant chose the best plan. 
Information Quality was a significant manipulation for this measure (
0.00013). Automation Visibility was not significant
error of the correct selection percentage for the low and high Information Qua
 
Figure 12. Mean and standard error for the correct selection percentage.
In each scenario, one of the plans considered by the automation was to hold and wait 
for a specified time given by air traffic control. All of the participants commented that they 
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Automation 
Visibility 
Information 
Quality 
 .491 .072 (m) 
 
 
.0005 (*) .044 (*) 
.559 .067 (m) 
.015 (*) .067 (m) 
automation .030 (*) .031 (*) 
6.1 Decision Performance 
F(1,11) = 32
. Figure 12 shows the means and standard 
Automation 
Visibility  
Information 
Quality 
.663 
.838 
.171 
.093m 
.031 (*) 
.98, p < 
lity conditions. 
 
 
 were biased towards picking the hold plan if displayed as an option, despite
only consider the policy statements, because holding was much easier than diverting based 
on their operational experience. Diversions introduce new tasks, e.g., reviewing new 
approach charts, planning for a new and possibly unfamiliar airpor
to their schedules. Participants’ comments also suggested that they considered passenger 
impact in their decisions much more heavily than what the policy statements warranted. 
Thus, participants were prone to selecting the hold pl
option. 
On average, participants correctly identified the best plan in 36% of the low 
Information Quality trials and 86% of the high Information Quality trials. Automation 
Visibility level was not significant, so this 
to catch the missing information. Overall, participants were not able to consistently detect 
missing information and incorporate that knowledge into their decisions
6.1.2 Time to Make a Selection
The time to make a selection was the elapsed time from the start of the Diversion Aid 
until participants made their diversion plan selection. Automation Visibility was a significant 
factor (F(2,22) = 3.67, p < 0.042) for this measure, with the low Automation Visibili
condition being significantly faster (
Visibility condition. Figure 13
Automation Visibility. 
Figure 13. Mean and standard error for diversion plan selection time.
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 being told to 
t, and making adjustments 
an (if presented) over the top ranked 
was not a driving factor in the participants’ ability 
. 
 
t(22) = 2.15, p < 0.043) than the high Automation 
 shows the time to make a selection as a function of 
 
ty 
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Plan selection times were shorter under the low Visibility level because there were 
fewer options to consider and less information to process and decipher. One participant 
commented that he preferred either the low or the high Automation Visibility level, as the 
medium Automation Visibility level (ranked options without cost) were too much work to 
interpret: 
“The single option was superior to rank ordered because a decision made 
without seeing the reason can just be a suggestion. Three suggestions without 
the reason behind add more workload. Having the decision cost allowed 
quicker decision making and a more informed decision.” 
6.2 Workload 
Two workload measures were gathered in the experiments. The first was a subjective 
workload, measured via the NASA-TLX questionnaire, which assess workload along six 
dimensions that are summed to arrive at a total workload value. The second measure was an 
objective measurement of workload based on performance of the secondary task of reporting 
traffic detected in an out-the-window view. 
6.2.1 Subjective Workload (NASA-TLX) 
The total NASA TLX workload showed no significant results for any of the 
dependent variables, nor their interaction. There were, however, individual TLX measures 
that showed significant or marginally significant results. 
Mental Demand: Automation Visibility had a marginally significant (F(2,22) = 3.41, p 
< 0.051) impact on the mental demand results. Looking further into a paired t-test between 
the three Automation Visibility levels shows significantly lower (t(22) = 2.10, p < 0.047) 
mental demand for the low Automation Visibility level vs. the medium level (see Figure 14). 
With only one plan presented by the automation, the only two choices would be to either 
accept the one provided or to reject it, resulting in less mental demand required compared to 
evaluating the costs of multiple plans. 
  
Figure 14. Mean and standard error of the total workload as assessed by the NASA
Temporal Demand: Automation Visibility had a significant (
impact on the temporal demand results. The paired t
Visibility level resulted in significantly (
compared to the medium level and was also marginally signi
0.068) than the high Automation Visibility condition.
temporal demand as a function of Automation Visibility
Figure 15. NASA-TLX measure of temporal demand as a function of Automation Visibility
Performance: a significant (
interaction of Information Quality and Automation Visibility. However, a Tukey HSD test 
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F(2,22) = 4
-test showed that the low Automation 
t(22) = 2.38, p < 0.027) lower temporal demand as 
ficantly lower (t
 Figure 15 shows the results of the 
. 
F(2,22) = 3.45, p < 0.050) result was obtained for the 
 
-TLX. 
.56, p < 0.022) 
(22) = 1.92, p < 
 
. 
 showed no practical significance when comparing each combination of interactions. 
16 shows the performance results for each Information Quality level as a function of 
Automation Visibility. 
Figure 16. NASA-TLX measure of performance as a function of Automation Visibility for t
low and high Information Quality levels.
  
6.2.2 Objective Workload
Performance on the secondary task of reporting traffic was used as an objective 
measure of workload. A decrease in percentage of detected targets indicates an increase in 
workload. Baseline measurements were also collected. Baseline measurements were taken 
during the first 90 seconds of the trial when participants were doing only the target detection 
task, before the onset of the diversion planning task.
The percentage of targets detected whil
plan is shown in Figure 17. The baseline measurements are not shown as they were all 100%.
The percentage of targets detected while participants were deciding on a diversion plan was 
marginally significantly greater (
condition. 
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e participants were deciding on a diversion 
F(1,10) = 4.06, p < 0.072)  in the high Information Quality 
Figure 
 
he 
 
 Figure 17. Percentage of targets detected during 
When participants noticed that there is a discrepancy in the information display
the automation, it takes more effort to assess the recommendations that it provides. This 
result follows the trend in the time to make a diversion plan selection, shown previously in 
Figure 13. 
Head tracking data was collected in order to capture the percentage of time 
participants spent looking at the aid vs. the time spent looking out the window. This measure 
can be used to compare the atte
being completed. The differences between low Automation Visibility and the medium and 
high Automation Visibility levels were significant (
< 0.0045, respectively). Figure 
of Automation Visibility. 
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the diversion selection task.
6.3 Attention Allocation 
ntional requirements between conditions while the task is 
t(18) = 4.02, p < 0.0008; and 
18 shows the percent time on the Diversion Aid as a function 
 
 
ed by 
t(18)= 3.24, p 
 Figure 18. Percentage of time participants spent looking at the 
their diversion plan selection as a function of Automation Visibility
Since there is less information in the low Automation Visibility level, less attention is 
required to observe and orient to the task. Between the two higher Automation Visibility 
levels, the attentional requirements are similar. Although more information is provided at the 
high level, it is information that is relevant to the decision task and having it rea
may offload cognitive resource requirements, thus balancing the overall attentional 
requirements. 
Information Quality also had significant (
allocation. Figure 19 illustrates these results, where the lower Information Quality level took 
more attention than the high Information Quality level.
Figure 19. Percentage of time participants
their diversion plan selection as a function of Information Quality.
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Diversion Aid while making 
F(1,9) = 5.45, p < 0.044) impact on attention 
 
 spent looking at the Diversion Aid while making 
 
. 
dily available 
 
 
 Confidence was a self
completion of each trial. Information Quality had
0.067) impact on confidence, with the low Information Quality condition resulting in lower 
confidence in the selection made.
Information Quality. As Information Quality degrades, the confidence participants have in 
making decisions based on that information also decreas
Figure 20. Confidence ratings as a function of Information Quality
 
Automation awareness was a self
following completion of each trial.
understanding of how the Diversion Aid arrived at its recommendations. Automation 
Visibility was a significant (F
Quality was marginally significant (
independent variables was also marginally significant (
shows the results of automation awareness
difference between medium and high Automation Visibility was significant (
0.013) and the difference between the low and high Automation Visibility levels was 
marginally significant (t(22) = 1.69, 
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6.4 Confidence 
-assessment rating gathered from participants following 
 marginally significant (F(1,11) 
 Figure 20 shows the confidence results as a function of
es. 
6.5 Automation Awareness 
-assessment rating gathered from participants 
 The question asked participants to provide their level of 
(2,22) = 5.08, p < 0.015) factor in this measure, Information 
F(1,11) = 4.11, p < 0.067), and the interaction of these two 
F(2,22) = 2.66, p < 0.093).
 as a function of Automation Visibility level. The 
p < 0.10). 
= 4.125, p < 
 
 
. 
 Figure 21 
t(22) = 2.69, p < 
 Figure 21. Automation awareness ratings
Although the low Automa
option, participants rated their understanding of its logic closer to that of the high 
Automation Visibility level than the medium level. Having only one option presented meant 
that participants only had to understand one plan, rather than having to understand three 
plans. With the costs included in the high Automation Visibility level, the details of the logic 
are much more readily available.
There was marginal significance (
Information Quality results (see 
Figure 22. Automation awareness ratings as a function of Infor
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 as a function of Automation Visibility
tion Visibility level only provided one diversion plan 
 
F(1,11) = 4.11, p < 0.067) between the low and high 
Figure 22). 
mation Quality
 
. 
 
. 
 Trust was a self-assessment rating gathered from participants following completion of 
each trial. Automation Visibility, Information Quality, and their interactions all had 
significant (F(2,20) = 4.18, p < 0.030; 
respectively) impact on the trust measure. For Automation Visibility, the difference in trust 
between the low and high levels was significant (
trust ratings are shown in Figure 
Figure 23. Trust ratings 
Trust in the high Informa
Automation Visibility conditions. In the low Information Quality condition, trust was lower 
than in the high Information Quality condition for both the low and medium Automation 
Visibility conditions. In the high Automation Visibility condition, trust in the system was the 
same for all three Automation Visibility conditions. Thus only when the system provides 
maximum information on its reasoning did the participants’ level of trust in low Information 
Quality situations approach the (constant) level of trust in the high Information Quality 
situation. 
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6.6 Trust 
F(1,10) = 6.26, p < 0.031; F(2,20) = 4.15, p < 0.031, 
t(20) = 2.40, p < 0.026). The results
23 as a function of Automation Visibility. 
as a function of Automation Visibility
tion Quality condition was the same across all three 
 of the 
 
. 
 6.7
After completing the six trials, participants filled out a post
to assess their opinions about the 
(since Display Mode was a between
total of 100 points to the three
clarity of information, 2) completeness of information, 3) ease of finding information, 4) 
helpfulness in making a decision, and 5) preference. The higher the points assigned, the more 
that Automation Visibility level was preferred over the other two.
The mean scores for each attribute and 
Figure 24 with the standard errors shown in parentheses below each mean. On average, 
participants felt that low Automation V
Automation Visibility was comple
were about equally helpful, with a slight preference for the low 
condition. No single Automation V
 
Figure 24. Mean (standard error) Diversion Aid attribute scores vs.
Considering individual 
strong preferences that varied
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 Diversion Aid Display Attributes 
-experiment 
three Automation Visibility levels for their Display Mode 
-subjects variable). Participants were asked to distribute a 
 Automation Visibility levels for each of five attributes: 1) 
 
Automation Visibility level are shown in
isibility was clear and easy to use, while high 
x. Participants felt that the Automation Visibility levels 
Automation V
isibility level was clearly preferred over the others.
 Automation
Preference ratings, it becomes clear that participants had 
 considerably. Nine of 12 participants gave 60 points or more to 
questionnaire 
 
isibility 
 
 
 Visibility level. 
 a single Automation Visibility 
Figure 25 graphically shows the individual scores for the participant’s preference attribute in 
order to convey the variety of the responses
Figure 25. Individual preferences for Automation Visibility levels.
 
6.3.1 Decision-making Strategies
Participants were asked to describe their decision
question after all the trials had been completed. 
their selection were varied and depended on the 
Automation Visibility level, half of them
the plan given as long as it seemed to make sense and they thought it was safe.
medium Automation Visibility level, 
understand why the plans were ranked as they were. 
strategy, while three indicated that they looked for the option to hold and selected it because 
it would keep them going to the same airports. 
and, as long as he felt it was safe, selected it (despite being briefed that all plans w
59 
level, but they did not all agree on which level was preferred. 
. 
 
-making strategies in an open
The strategies that participants used to make 
Automation Visibility level. For the low 
 trusted what the automation told them and selected 
five participants adopted some level of accounting to 
Four participants did not specify a 
One participant simply trusted the top plan 
 
 
-ended 
 For the 
ere safe). 
60 
 
For the high Automation Visibility level, three participants indicated they were reluctant to 
trust the costs provided to them. One, despite having been trained on the purpose of the aid, 
commented that he did not care about these costs, as they were related to issues outside of his 
primary responsibility of getting passengers to their destinations. 
6.3.2 Decision Aid Features 
Participants were asked about likes and dislikes about each Automation Visibility 
level. The most common feedback regarding features they liked about the low and medium 
Automation Visibility levels were their simplicity. However, in both the low and medium 
Automation Visibility levels, participants said they wanted more information and reasoning 
behind the best plan they were being shown (i.e., higher Automation Visibility). The 
feedback regarding the medium Automation Visibility level was the most varied. Three 
participants very much liked that three options were offered to them without reasoning 
information (i.e., costs) to evaluate on their own, while three others commented that they 
thought this was the worst level to work with because they wanted to either have the best 
option only (i.e., low Automation Visibility) or the costs provided (i.e., high Automation 
Visibility). Generally, participants preferred the inclusion of reasoning information in the 
high Automation Visibility condition, where three pilots commented that they liked having 
some insight into the financial impact of their diversion decisions. Two participants, 
however, commented that they did not care at all about those details. 
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CHAPTER 7   
DISCUSSION 
This study identified and experimentally investigated three characteristics of 
information automation on the flight deck: Information Quality, Automation Visibility, and 
Display Complexity. Several hypotheses were tested. Each of the hypotheses is reviewed in 
the next section, followed by an overall discussion of the study’s findings. The chapter closes 
with a set of recommendations generated by aggregation of the study’s conclusions. 
7.1 Review of Hypothesis Tests 
1. Increased Automation Visibility will result in increased primary task performance, 
increased confidence in decisions, and increased trust in automation, but at a cost of 
higher workload. 
In this study, there were no performance effects due to Automation Visibility. For all 
conditions, the increased Automation Visibility from low to high came at the cost of higher 
workload and increased selection time. In low Information Quality, an increase in 
Automation Visibility from low to high also showed an increase in trust, eventually reaching 
the trust level seen at high Information Quality, where trust remained constant between 
Automation Visibility levels. Automation awareness was greatest in high Automation 
Visibility. Finally, for low Information Quality situations, confidence in automation 
increased between low and high Automation Visibility; however, there was a drop in 
confidence in the high Information Quality condition. Coupled with the automation 
awareness results, this suggests that confidence in their choice and automation awareness 
increase when pilots understand the limits of the automation, but that confidence is 
negatively impacted by high workload. 
 
2. Higher Information Quality will result in better primary task performance when 
compared to lower Information Quality. 
Diversion plan selection performance was significantly higher when Information 
Quality was high when compared to selection performance when Information Quality was 
high when compared to selection performance when Information Quality was low. 
62 
 
3. Higher Automation Visibility will result in increased ability for pilots to compensate for 
poor Information Quality in the automation to maintain overall primary task performance 
(i.e., the difference in primary task performance between the low and high Information 
Quality conditions will be greater when Automation Visibility is low than when the 
visibility is high). 
Making the correct diversion decision under the low Information Quality condition 
required participants to use information received from another source (the briefing from the 
confederate) to check the information from the Diversion Aid. Participants were able to 
compensate for poor Information Quality on average 36% of the time. Automation Visibility 
level did not have an effect on these results. 
While previous research in this area (Sarter & Woods, 1992 and 1994b; Pritchett & 
Vándor, 2001; Skjerve & Skraaning, 2004; Seong & Bisantz, 2008; Bass et al., 2013) 
suggests that pilots should be able to compensate for poor automation decisions (in this case 
driven by poor Information Quality), the results of this study indicate several other factors 
contributed to the generally poor performance: workload, display complexity, trust, and 
operational biases. The complexity of the display made it difficult for participants to detect 
missing information, even when they knew they were looking for it (e.g., the participant who 
was actively searching to make sure that the unaccompanied minor was in the plan, yet failed 
to detect that that piece of information was missing). Their generally high trust in the 
automation coupled with the time pressure of the situation also caused pilots to spend less 
time checking for missing information. Even when they intuitively knew something was “not 
quite right” (as evidenced in the increased time spent making a decision in low Information 
Quality conditions), they often failed to detect the missing information. Another factor that 
affected performance overall was participants’ preference for the hold option, despite the 
policy cost values. 
 
4. The graphical display will result in increased task performance, increased detection of 
information quality issues, lower complexity, and lower workload when compared with 
the text display. 
The research hypothesis was not supported. Selection of the best option was not better 
with the graphic display than with the text display, nor was there improvement in the time to 
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make a selection. The graphic display also did not show any improvement over the text 
display when looking into the differences in performance due to Information Quality issues. 
Complexity ratings and workload results showed no significant reduction due to the Display 
Mode variable. The results suggest that, for schedule information, the tabular nature of the 
text display supported the overall task better than the spatial display of the schedule in the 
graphic mode. This is an example of a situation in which competing display principles need 
to be assessed to determine which is more important to overall performance and workload. 
7.2 Overall Discussion 
The experimental investigation into the human performance impacts of three 
information automation characteristics of Information Quality, Automation Visibility, and 
Display Complexity has provided some conclusive results and others that merit further 
investigation. A summary of the findings are: 
• Poor Information Quality was difficult for participants to detect, even when they 
were presented with the highest Automation Visibility level. Participants were 
able to compensate for poor information quality on average only about a third of 
the time. In the times that they did not successfully compensate, participants 
tended to over-trust the automation, so when information was missing and they 
were under high workload, they tended to choose the top plan suggested by the 
automation even though it was not the truly best plan according to the company 
policy statements. 
• The level of Automation Visibility affected decision time, with low Automation 
Visibility leading to the fastest decision. Automation Visibility also affected 
workload (but not in a strictly monotonically increasing capacity). That is, the 
highest level of Automation Visibility did not necessarily yield the lowest 
workload. General consensus from the participants’ qualitative responses, 
however, indicated that if multiple options are presented, they want some way to 
assess those options and understand the automation’s reasoning (high Automation 
Visibility level).Trust in automation is affected by Information Quality, but can be 
compensated for by increased Automation Visibility. In low Information Quality 
situations, trust was lower than in high Information Quality situations for low and 
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medium Automation Visibility; however trust was the same at high Automation 
Visibility. 
• A high level of trust in automation can lead to reluctance to override automation’s 
recommendations. This has a negative impact on decision performance when 
Information Quality is low. 
• In decision-making tasks, providing a ranked list of options without giving the 
reasoning behind the order results in higher workload. Providing more options in 
a decision-making task should only be done if the logic behind those options is 
also provided. 
• Higher Information Quality results in lower workload. 
• As Information Quality degrades, the confidence participants have in making 
decisions based on that information also decreases. 
• As operators are exposed to more of the automation’s logic, the more they trust it. 
7.3 Recommendations for Design 
A set of initial recommendations for design of information automation on the flight 
deck was provided in Honeywell’s Phase I report (Rogers et al., 2013). Part of the goal of 
this study was to help refine and update those recommendations, and to generate new ones 
based on the results of the experimental investigation. The resulting recommendations 
presented here are organized by the three information automation characteristics studied: 
Information Quality, Automation Visibility, and Display Complexity. A complete set of the 
combined Honeywell and Iowa State University recommendations can be found in (Rogers et 
al., 2014). 
 
7.3.1 Information Quality 
1. Appropriate levels of information quality should be defined for information 
automation systems, depending on the potential impact of the information on 
flight safety. 
Various properties of information quality should be considered, including: intrinsic 
quality, contextual quality, representational quality, and accessibility. The Diversion 
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Aid evaluation showed that performance can be impacted by the quality of 
information, and depending on the specific design of the information automation 
system, pilots may or may not be able to compensate. Thus, it is important that the 
automation system meets minimum standards for information quality. 
 
2. Information automation systems should check for input discrepancies. 
Information automation systems that are capable of using and processing redundant 
sources of data or information could provide comparisons of those sources. Any 
discrepancies or inconsistencies identified could be annunciated to support pilot 
awareness. 
 
3. Information automation systems that produce outputs that vary in quality (e.g., 
accuracy, completeness, timeliness) should annunciate those variations if 
possible. 
Systems can be designed so that they produce partial outputs or outputs based on 
partial inputs (e.g., a flight path Estimated Time of Arrival that does not consider 
winds aloft). This might be beneficial, for example, for a decision aid or a system 
which performs calculations where some input parameters have minor effects on the 
outcomes. But the results of the study presented here indicate that pilots have 
difficulty in determining if there is missing information, so it may be useful to present 
incomplete information with supporting information about the quality (e.g., 
annunciation that a certain factor is not included in a calculation). Further, 
information automation may produce outputs that are dynamic or can become “stale,” 
or which are inherently uncertain or probabilistic in nature, and an indication of these 
aspects of quality may be useful as well. For example, information that is 60 seconds 
old may be “real-time” in some systems (e.g. weather display) and “stale” in other 
systems (e.g. traffic alerting system). Some indication of the freshness or time last 
updated allows the pilots to bring in their understanding of the current context to 
decide how timely the data are. 
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In general, pilots in this study found it difficult to compensate for poor information 
quality, most likely due to factors such as interface design, task difficulty, and display 
complexity. The more the information automation system can display its own 
assessment of information quality, the more redundancy it provides in the joint 
human-automation system, since both the pilot and the automation should ideally be 
assessing the quality of the information. 
 
4. Training on information automation should consider rules of thumb for how to 
assess the quality of information outputs. 
As information automation systems become more powerful (e.g., adaptive systems 
that can assess contextual factors, intelligent systems that reason and learn), it may be 
more important for pilots to receive specific training on how these systems work, 
what their limitations are, how to verify their outputs, and so on. Further, as 
information automation supports pilots more and more in management and decision 
making tasks, it would be useful to train the best ways to utilize the aids to support 
those tasks. 
 
5. For effective usage of information automation systems and their output, training 
should be provided on issues such as information quality, distractions, workload, 
over-trust, and skill degradation. 
Information quality as defined in this work goes beyond accuracy and precision. In 
cases where the pilots are responsible for monitoring the outputs of an information 
automation system, they need strategies for searching for and detecting information 
quality issues. For instance, when assessing the diversion plans in our empirical 
evaluation, pilots may have benefited from being trained on a strategy to check 
through categories of information to ensure that they could identify missing 
information. 
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7.3.2 Automation Visibility 
1. Information for verifying or checking system reasoning and output should be 
available, easy to detect, and easy to access. It should be made obvious if some 
information that is normally presented is missing. 
The complexity of the task, the design of the interface, and the saliency of the 
information all play a role in whether pilots can detect that something is missing or 
inaccurate. Even in cases of high automation visibility, where the automation reveals 
its reasoning to the pilot, it is often difficult to notice what is not there. Thus the 
interface should provide support to help pilots know what information to look for to 
assist in cases where that information is missing. Explanations of system behavior 
and states, and quality of information outputs should be available upon demand. The 
results this study indicate such information led to increased automation awareness 
and to information automation systems that were more preferred by the pilots. 
 
2. Presentation of information to help pilots understand information automation 
state and outputs should be balanced against potential increases in pilot 
workload due to the time and attention needed to process this extra information. 
Even though information automation outputs are usually beneficial, if they require an 
inordinate amount of workload to validate (e.g., manual searching and integrating of 
information), the costs could outweigh the benefits from a human performance 
perspective. A balance between having automation visibility information and the time 
and effort needed for the pilot to process that information is important. In some cases, 
a small amount of automation visibility information, or automation visibility 
information that can be accessed on demand but not presented automatically, should 
be considered. If visibility information can be built into the information automation 
outputs themselves, less processing may be required to validate the outputs. The 
results the empirical study suggest that pilots may not spend extra effort searching for 
validation information. 
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3. If an Information Automation system provides choices or alternatives, 
information on how those choices were determined and their relative merits 
should be provided. 
The evaluation did not show a clear preference for a decision aid that showed the best 
option only versus one that showed multiple options with cost information. However, 
most participants wanted visibility into how those options were determined. They felt 
it was too much work to try and figure out why the system prioritized the options the 
way that it did. In comparison to the best option or options with supporting 
information, presenting options with no supporting information resulted in lower 
performance, slower performance, higher workload, more attention, and lower 
automation awareness. 
 
7.3.3 Display Complexity 
1. Information automation display complexity can compromise usability – in some 
cases it may be better to have a less capable system that reduces complexity and 
is easier to use. 
Adding new functions to an existing display are often seen as a way to improve 
operational safety and efficiency. Each additional function can add to the complexity 
of a single system or device in terms of pilots’ understanding of its behavior and the 
ease of interacting with the device. This could negatively affect user workload and the 
overall usability of the system.  
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CHAPTER 8  
CONCLUSION 
8.1 Summary of Research 
Based on a previously published definition and framework of information automation 
on the flight deck (Rogers et al., 2013), both heuristic and analytical methods were employed 
to generate and refine a set of characteristics to describe information automation in this 
domain. Three of these characteristics were selected for further experimental study into the 
human performance impacts of flight deck information automation. Analysis of the 
experimental results informed design recommendations to address the observed impacts. 
8.2 Contributions 
This work addresses a previously identified need for a more formal definition and 
characterization of flight deck information automation (FAA, 2013b). As more information 
becomes available on the flight deck, it is crucial that the human performance impacts of 
information automation systems be well understood by designers so that pilots and the 
automation are able to work in harmony to ensure mission safety as well as a more efficient 
flying environment as envisioned by NextGen. Lessons learned by past accidents have shown 
that discord between pilots and automation can have catastrophic consequences (e.g., Asiana 
Airlines, 2014; et d’Analyses, 2009; Palmer, 2013). With the increasing amount of 
information available to pilots, information automation is seen to be equally as important as 
control automation to achieve these safety and efficiency goals. 
This work also provides the experimental results and analyses that informed a first set 
of recommendations for the design of flight deck information automation systems. With 
these recommendations, the human factors issues associated with these systems can be 
addressed. 
Lastly, by stepping through each stage of the process for developing an experiment to 
test a subset of the characteristics identified, the work provides a roadmap for developing 
further experimental studies to expand on the results and recommendations provided here.  
This expansion of research will be necessary in order to further the understanding of the 
human factors impacts of information automation on the flight deck. 
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8.3 Future Work 
This work was a first step in understanding the human factors impacts of flight deck 
information automation systems, but there are open questions that warrant further 
investigation. For example, this study only looked at a subset of the dimensions of 
information quality (data that was missing or incomplete). Furthermore, the human factors 
impacts of the characteristics that were not studied experimentally during this research are 
also important to address. Additional recommendations for design could then be generated to 
complement those created from this work. 
Another impact of information automation that would be important to understand for 
mitigation purposes is the area of cognitive skill degradation. Designers are continuing to 
improve the capabilities of the information automation technology available to pilots, but if 
and when something goes wrong, will pilots be able to take over those tasks that have been 
done for them? How often should pilots receive training to ensure they are not losing 
important skills to accomplish the tasks that have been taken over by automation? These are 
just a few of the questions regarding cognitive skill degradation that will need to be 
addressed as information automation becomes more sophisticated and capable. 
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APPENDIX A 
POST-TRIAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. How confident were you in your decision? 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Not at all Slightly Somewhat Fairly Very 
 
2. To what degree do you understand how the aid came up with its recommendations? 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 No Slight Some Fairly Good Very High 
 understanding understanding understanding understanding understanding 
 
3. How much did you trust the recommendation(s) given to you? 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Not at all Slightly Somewhat Mostly Very Much 
 
4. How easy was it for you to find information on the display? 
a) I could see the information effortlessly. 
b) I could find the information with a few quick glances. 
c) I could find the information by searching in a local area of the display. 
d) I had to search through the display to find the information. 
 
5. How easy was it for you to understand / comprehend the displayed information? 
a) The information was very straightforward. I could understand the meaning without 
thinking. 
b) I could integrate the pieces of information and use them properly, but would prefer that 
information be presented in a less intermingled manner. 
c) I needed to use some strategies to manage the displayed information. That took my mental 
resources away from other tasks. 
d) I had to simultaneously associate (or to relate) multiple pieces of displayed information to 
use the display. It was difficult to hold them all at once. 
 
6. How would you rate the perceptual complexity of the display? 
a) The display looked simple and clear; I could find the needed information easily and 
quickly. 
b) The display looked busy but I could find the information with a little effort. 
c) Many pieces of information did not relate to my task; they adversely affected my 
perception of information. 
d) The display looked too busy for me to find the information. 
 
7. Please explain why you made the choice you did. 
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APPEDNIX B 
POST-EXPERIMENT QUESTIONNAIRE 
1)  What strategies did you use to make your decisions within each display? 
A – best plan only 
 
 
B – rank-ordered top three plans 
 
 
C – rank-ordered top three plans with decision cost 
 
 
 
2) For each display, please list three things you liked. 
A – best plan only 
 
 
B – rank-ordered top three plans 
 
 
C – rank-ordered top three plans with decision cost 
 
 
 
3) For each display, please list three things you would improve. 
A – best plan only 
 
 
B – rank-ordered top three plans 
 
 
C – rank-ordered top three plans with decision cost 
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Please distribute 100 points between the three display types for each of the following attributes (more 
points indicate higher preference; 100 point sum per attribute): 
 
 
Attribute 
 
 
Display 
Type 
 
Clarity of 
information 
 
 
Completeness 
of information 
 
 
How easy it 
was to find 
information 
 
 
Helpfulness in 
performing 
the task 
 
 
Preference 
 
A: 
best plan 
only 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B: 
rank-ordered 
top three 
plans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C: 
rank-ordered 
top three 
plans with 
decision cost 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUM  must 
equal 100 in 
each column 
 
SUM = 100 
 
SUM = 100 
 
SUM = 100 
 
SUM = 100 
 
SUM = 100 
 
 
If you have any comments you would like to add regarding the table above, please write 
them here: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
